“NEYPES RULE” IN NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
By: Bert Junrie B. Espina
The Neypes rule, or what is known as “the fresh period rule,” was explained by the Supreme Court that when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, and such motion is denied by the court, the party is given a fresh period of 15 days in which to file his or her appeal which refers not to the order of the denial but to the judgment or final order itself subject of either motions (Section 9 of Rule 37, Rules of Court). The 15-day period under the rule is reckoned on the date of the receipt of the said judgment or final order by the defeated party.
This rule finds no application to non-judicial proceedings, such as those matters brought before the administrative bodies. In other words, the Neypes rule covers only judicial proceedings.
However, it must be emphasized that in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Neypes Rule to administrative decisions, there existed a specific administrative rules of procedure explicitly precluding the application of the Neypes rule.
This pronouncement by the Supreme Court can be traced in the case of Puerto Del Sol Palawan, Inc. (PDSPI) vs. NCIP RHO, G.R. №212607, the Supreme Court allowed the application of the 15-day fresh period of a case before the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer (NCIP RHO).
Under the facts of this case, PDSPI filed his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) from the adverse decision rendered by the NCIP RHO but already 14 days or a day prior the lapse of the reglementary period, as provided under the NCIP’s Rules of Procedure, to assail the decision of the NCIP RHO, which was denied. After it received the order of denial of its MR, PDSPI opted to file an appeal 15 days from receipt of the denial of its MR. The appeal was denied by the NCIP RHO, stating that the reckoning period to file the appeal should be from its decision of the original action, hence, the appeal by PDSPI was filed beyond the reglementary period. And since the MR was filed on the 14th day, it said that PDSPI had only 1 day left to file the appeal without the 15-day fresh period.
The Supreme Court overturned the said decision by the NCIP RHO; instead, it applied the Neypes rule in the case of PDSPI, because the existing and prevailing NCIP Rules of Procedure at the time clearly adopted the Neypes rule.
But as can be gleaned in this case, it upheld the Neypes rule because there was a specific administrative rules of procedure which explicitly adopted it just like with the several cases it cited that the non-application of the Neypes rule was predicated on the fact that there was a specific administrative rules of procedure which explicitly precludes the application. From the two positions, there existed a specific provision under the administrative procedure whether or not it adopted the Neypes rule. Yet, it seems to me that we cannot infer from the pronouncement by the Supreme Court and in the cited cases, that in order for it to find the non-application of the Neypes rule there must be a specific proviso under the Rules of Procedure of a particular administrative body for the non-application of such.
Thus, I humbly submit this question, what if the administrative rules of procedure of a particular administrative body is silent on the adoption of the Neypes rule? That is to say, there is without any explicit provision whether or not it adopts the Neypes rule. Should it apply the Neypes rule by way of analogy that the Rules of Court partakes a suppletory application in the administrative proceedings? Or should it maintain the rule that the Neypes rule has no application on non-judicial proceedings? But it is important to remember that we must go back to the basic principle that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court in any administrative proceeding is only an exception to the rule as provided in Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
